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126 Abstract
This paper analyses the impact of fiscal imbalances on expectations for an emerg-
ing economy with inflation targeting. In particular, based on the Colombian expe-
rience, we build a fiscal credibility index and evaluate its impact on inflation 
expectations for the 2004-2019 period. To analyse fiscal and monetary interac-
tions, we propose an econometric model and use the OLS and GMM methods. The 
results show that the loss of fiscal credibility, associated with divergences between 
the fiscal deficit and agents’ expectations, can increase inflation expectations by 
between 9% and 12%. Furthermore, inflation expectations in Colombia incorpo-
rate important macroeconomic information related to unemployment, GDP and 
exchange rates.
Keywords: inflation expectations, fiscal policy, credibility
1 INTRODUCTION
Theanchoringfactors for inflationexpectationsareessential forfine-tuningan
economicpolicyframework(Mankiw,ReisandWolfers,2003).Ininflationtar-
geting, expectations aremonitored by central banks because agents set prices





inflationexpectationswillnotbe low.Basedon this relativeconsensus ineco-






more effects in countrieswith high and persistent inflation.A similar result is
reportedbydeMendonçaandMachado(2013).Celasun,GelosandPrati(2004)
aswell as deMendonça andTostes (2015) note that fiscal balance recoveries
reduceinflationexpectationsandobservedinflation.Otherstudies,suchasCeri-
solaandGelos(2009),suggestthattheinflationtarget,pastinflation,andthepri-
mary fiscal balance can anchor inflation expectations in emerging economies.
Nonetheless, Celasun, Gelos and Prati (2004) provide empirical evidence that
inflationexpectationshavebackward-lookingcomponentsdespiteinflationtarget
announcements.SimilarresultsarereportedbyAraujoandGaglianone(2010)and
Gaglianone (2017),whohighlight that inflation expectations showpersistence.
Otherperspectives,forexample,BerlemannandElzemann(2006),findthatinfla-
































































































deficit expectations and expected economic growth. In the fiscal management
strand,thegovernmentestablishedadecreasinggoalforthefiscaldeficit tocon-
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reduces deficit volatility and contributes to price stability.A similar result is
reportedforthecaseofJapan.AccordingtoShirakawa(2012),whenthegovern-
mentlosescredibilityregardingdebtsustainability,inflationincreases,boosting
interest ratesand increasingdefaultprobabilities.Similarly, for thecaseof the
























































































the impact of stimuli related to public spending. In addition, credible market
announcementshelpreducethecostsassociatedwithloansanddebtservice.





growers, industrialists, merchants, and other agents had representation on the
board of directors. In this period, the Colombian economy exhibited average
annualinflationratesof20%.
Theindependenceofthecentralbankwasachievedin1991withthereformofthe














citof less than1%ofGDPfrom2022 (López-Enciso,Vargas-HerreraandRod-
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Inflation expectations in the Colombian economy (in %)
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relationto thegovernment’sability toavoidtheriskofdefault.Moreover, it is













































































































that considers thedifferencesbetween theagents’ expectationsabout thefiscal
deficitandtheoverallfiscaldeficitobserved(asanabsolutevalue):






asksbrokers,commercialbanks,pension funds,academic institutes,and rating
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132 includingtheoverallfiscaldeficit.Thequarterlydataareavailablefrom2004(see
appendix,tableA1).
The behaviour of both variables (DEF and E(DEF)) over time is presented in
figure2below.Itisobservedthatfrom2004to2008,expectationsunderestimated








Fiscal deficit expectations and overall fiscal deficit observed in Colombia (in % of GDP)
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133Figure 3
Fiscal credibility loss in Colombia case (in %)
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Source: Author's elaboration. Data from the Central Bank of Colombia.
Credibility is theabilityofpolicymakers to inspireconfidence,and itcanhelp
formexpectations.AccordingtoMishkin(2007),inflationtargetinginanenviron-
mentof lowfiscalcredibilitycausesdifficulties inmanaging inflationexpecta-
tionsandimpactstheeffectivenessofmonetarypolicy.Hence,thebaselinemodel
consideredinourempiricalanalysisisasfollows:
 E(πt) =β1 + β2CRED_LOSSt +α3Xt + εt (3)
whereE(πt) is the annualized inflation expectations,CRED_LOSSt is thefiscal
policycredibilityloss,Xtisavectorofexplanatoryvariables,andεtistheresidual
term.
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134 Figure 4
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Source: Author's elaboration. Data from the Central Bank of Colombia.
Expectationsdependonpastinformation,andeachagentinterpretstheavailable
informationinadifferentway(Roberts,1997).Infact,theincreaseininflation
expectations can be attributed tobackward-looking behaviour (Dornbusch and


















formance (yt-1, Ut-1).Thepast inflationexpectationsarealso incorporatedasan
explanatoryvariable(E(πt-1)) tocapturesomeinertiainexpectations.Adummy
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135subprimecrisis.Thisdummytakesavalueof1fortheyear2008.1Thus,thepos-
siblecombinationsofthesevariablesallowustopostulatethefollowingmodels:
E(πt) =α0  + α1 E(πt–1) + α2CRED_LOSSt +α3VIXt–1 + α4πt–1 + α5yt–1 + α6Dt+ εt 0(4)
E(πt) =α7  + α8 E(πt–1) + α9CRED_LOSSt +α10VIXt–1 + α11et–1 + α12yt–1 + α13Dt+ εt 1(5)
E(πt) =α14  + α15 E(πt–1) + α16CRED_LOSSt +α17VIXt–1 + α18πt–1 + α19Ut–1 + α20Dt+ εt 2 (6)
E(πt) =α21  + α22 E(πt–1) + α23CRED_LOSSt +α24VIXt–1 + α25et–1 + α26Ut–1 + α27Dt+ εt 3(7)
Additionally,weestimatethefullmodelwithallthevariables:
E(πt) =α28  + α29 E(πt–1) + α30CRED_LOSSt +α31VIXt–1 + α32πt–1 + α33yt–1  
 + α34et–1 + α35Ut–1 + α36Dt+ εt 4 (8)
















Schwarz criterion (Harris, 1995).The cointegration test proposed by Johansen
(1991)basedonthesignificanceoftheestimatedeigenvaluesindicatestheexist-
enceofacointegrationvectorinthemodels(seetableA3,appendix).Thus,the
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138 The equations abovewere estimated usingOrdinaryLeast Squares (OLS) and
GeneralizedMethodofMoments (GMM). In thecaseof themodelsestimated
with OLS, tests of autocorrelation (LM test) and heteroscedasticity (Breuch-
Pagan-Godfreytest)wereappliedtovalidatetheestimates.AccordingtoHansen
(1982),themainreasonforusingtheGMMmethodisbecauseendogeneityand














ity, theexpected inflationdecreases.Theevidencesupports the theoreticalper-
spectiveofSargentandWallace(1981)andthefindingsconfirmthatthelower
uncertaintyabouttheexpectedfiscaldeficitand,therefore,greaterfiscalcredibil-









(VIXt-1), theestimationsshowthat theparameter isnotsignificant.Thisfinding
suggests that increases in global financial uncertainty do not increase inflation
expectationsinColombia.Theimportanceofpastinflation(πt-1)fortheformation
ofexpectationsisalsosignificant.UsingtheresultsofBomfimandRudebusch
(2000), it ispossible to affirm that since inflationexpectations respond topast
























































































tions are better anchored. Some empirical studies highlight similar results for
emerging economies that have adopted inflation targeting (see,Celasun,Gelos
and Prati, 2004; Bevilaqua,Mesquita andMinella, 2008; Cerisola andGeros,
2009;Gaglianone,2017).
Inthecaseoftheparameterassociatedwiththeexchangerate(et-1),thecoefficient
ispositiveandsignificant.Accordingly,depreciation tends to increase inflation
expectations in the Colombian economy. This result indirectly confirms the
hypothesisthatfirmcostsaretiedtothebehaviouroftheexchangerateduetoits























































































































Fiscal credibility coefficient: recursive estimates, model 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 (in %)
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146 APPENDIX
Table a1
Sources of data and description of the variables
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147Table a2
Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Min. Max. SD.
E(π) 3.9455 2.8766 5.6900 0.7804
DEF 3.0272 1.2166 4.6816 0.8691
E(DEF) 2.4996 0.6500 4.0800 0.9183
CRED LOSS 0.9798 0.0200 3.1400 0.7920
π 4.3057 1.8464 8.2436 1.6576
e 2,360.02 1,762.14 3,462.01 495.15
U 10.6105 8.4389 14.2076 1.3231
y 12.0552 11.7126 12.3205 0.1811
VIX 18.1577 9.5100 44.1400 7.7106
Note: E(π), DEF, E(DEF), CRED LOSS, π and U were used in %.
Table a3
Unit root tests (ADF, PP, and KPSS)
Series
ADF PP KPSS
Lags Esp. Test C.V (1%) Banda Esp. Test
C.V 
(1%) Banda Esp. Test
C.V 
(5%)
E(π) 1 C -2.44 -3.54 3 N -1.28 -2.60 4 C,T 0.16 0.14
CRED 
LOSS 2 N -1.16 -2.60 1 N -1.61 -2.60 5 C,T 0.15 0.14
π 1 C -3.15 -3.56 3 N -1.06 -2.60 3 C,T 0.16 0.14
e 0 N -0.65 -2.60 1 N -0.53 -2.60 6 C,T 0.23 0.14
U 0 C -2.86 -3.55 3 C -2.86 -3.55 5 C 0.84 0.46
y 0 C,T -1.75 -4.11 4 C,T -1.59 -4.13 6 C 1.00 0.46
VIX 0 C -3.61 -3.54 1 C -3.49 -3.54 5 C,T 0.15 0.14
Note: C.V., critical value. Trend (T) and intercept (I) are included based on Schwarz criterion. 
ADF –the final choice of lag was made based on Schwarz criterion. PP and KPSS – spectral 
estimation method is Bartlett kernel and the Newey-West Bandwidth is used.
Table a4
VAR lag order selection criteria (with constant)
Lag Schwarz Lag Schwarz
Equation(4) Equation(5)
0 8.81 0 14.31
1  1.50* 1   6.74*
2 2.08 2  7.56
Equation(6) Equation(7)
0 2.95 0 19.57
1 -3.75* 1  13.45*
2 -3.07 2 14.70
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148 Table a5
Number of cointegrating relations by model











trace 2 3 2 2 3
Equation(5)
trace 2 2 2 2 3
Equation(6)
trace 1 1 2 2 3
Equation(7)
trace 1 1 1 1 2
Johansen’s cointegration test
Hyp.N.of
CE(s) Eigenvalue Tracestatistic Criticalvalue(0.05) p-value
Equation(4)
R=0 0.50 96.73 69.81 0.00
R≤1** 0.46 60.18 47.85 0.00
R=2 0.31 27.34 29.79 0.09
Equation(5)
R=0 0.62 116.19 76.97 0.00
R≤1** 0.50 65.87 54.07 0.00
R=2 0.27 29.77 35.19 0.17
Equation(6)
R=0** 0.56 95.52 76.97 0.00
R≤1 0.35 52.48 54.07 0.06
Equation(7)
R=0** 0.62 109.60 88.80 0.00
R≤1 0.42 59.65 63.87 0.10
Note: *Model selected by the Schwarz criterion. Values based on Mackinnon. **Denotes the null 
hypothesis rejection at 5%.
Table a6
List of GMM instruments
Model1 E(π)t-2,E(π)t-3,CREDLOSSt-2,CREDLOSSt-3,πt-2,πt-3,yt-4,yt-5,VIXt-2,VIXt-3,VIXt-4,Dt-1
Model2 E(π)t-2,E(π)t-3,CREDLOSSt-2,et-3,et-4,yt-3,yt-4,VIXt-2,VIXt-3,VIXt-4, Dt-1
Model3 E(π)t-2,E(π)t-3,E(π)t-4,CREDLOSSt-2,CREDLOSSt-3,πt-2, πt-3,Ut-2, VIXt-2,Dt-1
Model4 E(π)t-2,E(π)t-3,E(π)t-4, CREDLOSSt-2,CREDLOSSt-3,et-2,et-3,Ut-2,Ut-3, Ut-4,VIXt-2,Dt-1
Model5 E(π)t-2,E(π)t-3, CREDLOSSt-2,CREDLOSSt-3,et-2,et-3,yt-4,yt-5,Ut-2,Ut-3,VIXt-2,πt-2, πt-3, Dt-1
